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In Search of Lost Market Shares
The arrival of powerful new players on world mar-kets –the foremost of these being China– automa-tically decreases market share for advanced eco-
nomies. But France’s export market share has decreased 
more than that of other European countries. This is not a 
result of poor geographic or sectoral specialisation, insuf-
ﬁ cient exporter support, under-representation of SMEs in 
exports or credit constraints, but, more fundamentally, is 
caused by an inadequate “quality/price ratio” for French 
products on average. When products are of quality, results 
are exceptional, as demonstrated by the luxury, aeronauti-
cal and electrical distribution goods sectors –sectors, with 
a ﬂ agship– and/or by brands, which appear to play a key 
role.
A country’s competitiveness comprises a price dimension 
and a non-price dimension. Regarding price competitive-
ness, direct labour costs represent just 23%, on average, of 
the total value of French exports and 44% when including 
the cost of labour for domestic intermediate consumption. 
Price competitiveness is therefore not solely a matter of 
labour costs for exporting companies. We also need to 
look at the input side, whether it be at intermediate goods 
(possibly imported), energy or even services produced 
in France for exporting companies. The central message 
here is that competitiveness is everybody’s concern, and 
not just that of industrial companies. Greater eﬃ  ciency 
in non-tradable sectors (business services, construction, 
public services) also contributes to the creation of price 
competitiveness.
Non-price competitiveness is more diﬃ  cult to measure; 
we rely on disaggregated data to provide a diagnosis by 
product, a micro-economic approach that is particularly 
well-suited to demonstrate the quality eﬀ ect. Amongst the 
OECD countries, France retains a relatively good position 
in terms of the number of sectors in the top ten for non-
price competitiveness (7th). However, we see a drop-oﬀ  
since 2008 with a downturn in a number of sectors.
Non-price competitiveness policies and producti-
vity policies largely overlap, which is why we empha-
size the importance of reallocating production factors 
(labour and capital) to help the most productive compa-
nies develop faster. Reforms seeking to reduce the regu-
lation of the goods, services and labour markets need to 
explicitly take this objective into account. Moreover, the 
example of luxury goods demonstrates the importance of 
brands in the creation of non-price competitiveness. The 
protection of intellectual property rights should be a prio-
rity for France and the European Union in international 
negotiations.
a CEPII; b Paris School of Economics (PSE) and CEPII, Member of the CAE;
c Sciences Po, Member of the CAE; d Sciences Po, Banque de France and CEPII.
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In Search of Lost Market Shares
How France is losing market shares
The incursion of so-called “emerging” economies on world 
markets has automatically led to a drop in market share for all 
advanced economies. This downward trend of French market 
share, which is well documented in a number of reports, is the-
refore in part a reﬂ ection of the reconﬁ guration of world trade. 
Nevertheless, we should be concerned by the fact that French 
market share has dropped further than that of other countries 
in the European Union, with the exception of Italy (graph 1).1 
Between 1995 and 2013, France’s market share dropped by 
42% for goods and services, as did that of Italy, whilst this 
ﬁ gure stood at just 21% for Germany and 27% for the United 
Kingdom, with Spain retaining an almost stable market share.2
In this Note we focus solely on the export of goods that are 
central to international trade and for which detailed statistics 
are available by product and trading partner.3
State of play
France’s poor performance in the export of goods is some-
times attributed to its poor geographic or sectoral posi-
tioning. If this were true, we would need to better identify 
high-growth countries and sectors so as to reduce loss of 
market share: large emerging economies, agri-food, health, 
new information and communications technology, and sus-
tainable cities.4
European countries, which trade a great deal between them-
selves, suﬀ er from a negative geographic composition eﬀ ect 
since Europe is growing at a slower pace than the rest of the 
world (Asia in particular). No European country has escaped 
this eﬀ ect and France is, from this point of view, average over 
the period from 2006 to 2014 (table 1 and method in box 1). 
The countries that have been most successful in positioning 
themselves on emerging markets have suﬀ ered slightly less 
from this “European” eﬀ ect: this is the case for Germany and 
Italy. However the geographical eﬀ ect has a greater impact 
on Spain and the United Kingdom than it does on France.
As for product specialisation, this generally accounts for very 
little in the market share variations observed between 2006 
and 2014 as shown in table 1. In the case of France however, 
this specialisation has proved to be an advantage compared 
to Germany: the geographic disadvantage of French expor-
ters compared with German exporters has been overcompen-
sated by more favourable product positioning. The combined 
contribution of country specialisation and product speciali-
1. Changes in world market share for goods 
2006-Q1 to 2014-Q3 annual average variation in %
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EU-28 4.4 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.0
Euro area at 17 4.3 – 2.0 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.1
France 3.0 – 3.2 – 0.8 0.7 – 3.1
Germany 4.5 – 1.7 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 1.0
Italy 4.0 – 2.2 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 1.1
Spain 4.5 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.1 – 0.5
United Kingdom 2.3 – 3.9 – 0.9 0.4 – 3.3
World 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Interpretation: Variations are in delta-log. For example, where 
market share falls from 10 to 9%, the variation recorded is 
ln(9/10) = – 10.5 %.
Source: World Bank, Export Competitiveness Database.
In drawing up this Note, a number of interviews were carried out with various bodies. Without their being in any way liable, the authors would like to thank 
their contacts for making themselves available and for their contributions, in particular those at Business France, BPI France, and the Treasury. They would 
also like to thank Alice Keogh, research assistant at the CAE, for her precious assistance.
1 In this Note we work on the basis of world market share, including intra-European trade ﬂ ows. France’s market share is the ratio between French exports to 
all foreign markets (including European) and all global exports (including intra-European).
2 The drop in French market share stood at 47% for goods (between 1995 and 2014) compared with 21% for Germany, 30% for Italy and 41% for the United 
Kingdom. We note however that the French performance is average within the OECD.
3 For an analysis of services exports, please see, for example Gaulier G., E. Milet and Mirza D. (2010): “Les ﬁ rmes françaises dans le commerce international 
des services”, Économie et Statistique, no 435-436, pp. 125-147.
4 See the Direction générale du Trésor (2012): Analyse prospective des marchés à l’export, par secteur et par pays, French Ministry for the Economy and 
Finance, October.
1. Changes in world market share for goods and
services for the ﬁ ve largest EU countries, 1995 to 2013
Analysis: Exports in goods and services in percentage of world exports 
including intra-European trade.
Source: The World Trade Organisation.
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sation in explaining loss of market share is practically zero in 
the case of France (– 0.1% average per annum) whilst it is clear-
ly negative for Germany (– 0.7% per annum). Germany’s better 
performance is therefore solely explained by “pure” competiti-
veness eﬀ ects: French exporters are less eﬀ ective than German 
exporters in selling the same product on the same market.
This “pure” competitiveness eﬀ ect is quantitatively signiﬁ cant. 
To see this at work, it is possible to compute what France’s mar-
ket share would have been if it had not lost more “pure” com-
petitiveness than Germany between 2006 and 2014. Its loss 
in market share would thus have been 0.75% on average per 
annum instead of the 3% loss shown in table 1. This represents 
a loss of €112 billion for 2014 in terms of the export of goods.5
World trade experienced a sharp decline in 2009, followed 
by a more long-term slowdown after the automatic rebound 
in 2010. The year 2009 also marked the start of the speciﬁ -
cly European economic crisis, which placed European Union 
exporters in an even less favourable position, given their 
strong exposure to European Union markets. Table 2 shows 
that between 2009 and 2014, the contribution made by geo-
graphic specialisation to losses in market share practically 
doubled for all European countries. In France however, this 
negative eﬀ ect was oﬀ set by a strongly positive product spe-
cialisation eﬀ ect. As such, loss in French market share since 
2009 (– 1% per annum on average) is essentially explained, 
as since 2006, by a competitiveness factor. However, these 
global developments hide very diﬀ erent realities. One sector 
in particular –luxury goods– has recorded good trade perfor-
mance and deserves closer analysis.
Observation 1. Poor French export 
performance is linked to an inadequate 
“quality/price ratio”, not to poor country 
or product positioning.
2. Changes in world market share for goods
2009-Q1 to 2014-Q3 annual average variation in %
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EU-28 0.3 – 2.3 – 1.8 0.5 – 1.0
Euro area at 17 0.1 – 2.5 – 1.8 0.5 – 1.3
France – 1.0 – 3.5 – 1.5 1.5 – 3.5
Germany 0.5 – 2.0 – 1.3 0.5 – 1.2
Italy – 0.3 – 2.8 – 1.4 0.2 – 1.6
Spain 1.1 – 1.4 – 1.9 0.7 – 0.1
United Kingdom – 0.2 – 2.7 – 1.6 0.7 – 1.8
World 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: World Bank, Export Competitiveness Database.
1. Breakdown of market share variations 
between 2006 and 2014
In order to pinpoint the contribution made by geographic 
and sectoral specialisations in market share evolution, 
we made use of the Export Competitiveness Data Base 
developed by the World Bank in collaboration with the 
Banque de France and the International Trade Centre 
(CNCUCED-OMC). The “shift share” method proposed 
by Gaulier & al. (2013)a was applied to quarterly data 
starting in 2006 for 228 countries or territories at the 
HS-6 level of the Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding Sytem which comprises some 5,000 pro-
ducts. The latest data available was for the third quar-
ter of 2014. Compared with the “traditional shift-share”b 
method, the one used to create this database has a 
greater frequency of data and takes into account exten-
sive trade margins (increase in the number of products 
exported or the number of destinations served).
Variations in exports for each category of product/expor-
ting country/importing country/quarter are regressed 
under the ﬁ xed eﬀ ects of product, exporter and importer 
enabling the eﬀ ect of “pure” competitiveness to be isola-
ted by deduction for each exporting country. This “pure” 
competitiveness eﬀ ect answers the following question:  
“What would the variation in exports for a country be 
if the geographic and sectoral structure of its exports 
were the same as that of its competitors?”.c
a Gaulier G., G. Santoni, D. Taglioni and S. Zignago (2013): “In the 
Wake of the Global Crisis: Evidence from a New Quarterly Database 
of Export Competitiveness”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, no 6733.
b Cheptea A., G. Gaulier and S. Zignago (2005): “World Trade 
Competitiveness: A Disaggregated View by Shift-Share Analysis”, 
CEPII Working Paper, no 2005-23. Cheptea A., C. Emlinger, 
L. Fontagné, G. Oreﬁ ce and O. Pindyuk (2014): “The Development 
of EU and EU Member States’ External Competitiveness”, CEPII 
Working Paper, no 2014-06. Cheptea A., L. Fontagné and 
S. Zignago (2014): “European Export Performance”, Review of 
World Economics, vol. 150, no 1, pp. 25-58.
c We would like to thank Gianluca Santoni (CEPII) for extracting 
the data.
5 This calculation is based on the variation when comparing Germany’s market share and that of France up to the fourth quarter of 2013. The export “deﬁ cit” 
measured in this way at the end of 2013 is applied to world trade in 2014; 0.76 points of 18,784 x 1,021/1.3 with world exports of goods of $18,784 billion 
in 2013 and world trade growth estimated at 2.1% in value terms in 2014 (CPB, World Trade Monitor estimate). We use an average euro-dollar exchange 
rate of 1.3.
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The counter-example of luxury goods
A labour-intensive industry located –at least in part– in a 
country deemed to suﬀ er from high labour costs, the French 
luxury goods industry has proved able to compete with 
emerging countries and to beneﬁ t from the rapid growth of 
an aﬄ  uent class within these countries. Two recent studies 
shed light on this success based on data from the grouping of 
part of the luxury goods industry within the Comité Colbert.6 
A variety of sectors are covered: tableware, decoration, clo-
thing, drinks, perfumes, jewellery, handbags and shoes, and 
confectionery.
Three results emerge:
 – advanced countries are less disadvantaged, all other 
things being equal, in the export of luxury goods than in 
that of other industrial products: the high-end positio-
ning “protects” them from competition from emerging 
countries;
 – the export of luxury goods is less sensitive to distance 
than the average for other products;
 – luxury goods react to a greater extent than other 
exports to an increase in purchasing power in destina-
tion markets, but this is only the case for a handful of 
exporting countries, including France.
At the centre of this success is one crucial variable: brands. 
The factor explaining France’s diﬀ erence (as well as Italy and 
Switzerland) is the number of luxury brands from the expor-
ter country amongst the top 100 global brands. 24 in France 
compared with 10 in Switzerland, 7 in Italy and just 1 in Japan 
(cf. World Luxury Association).
Observation 2. The sectors which 
have been most successful in resisting 
competition rely on strong brands.
Too few exporters?
We have seen above how export growth can be broken down 
into a geographic specialisation component, a sectoral spe-
cialisation component and a “pure” competitiveness factor. 
Another interesting analysis separates the ampliﬁ cation, over 
time, of already existing ﬂ ows (for example exports from 
France of small Peugeot cars to Denmark), from the creation 
of new ﬂ ows (new products, new markets or new exporting 
companies).
In the short term (from one year to the next), the growth in 
French exports is overwhelmingly explained by an increase 
in the ﬂ ows already in place, known as the intensive mark-
up (87.7%)7. The remainder (12.3%), known as the extensive 
mark-up, is new ﬂ ow creation: 2.4% is the result of the arrival 
of new companies (net of the departure of companies which 
were previously present in the export market), and 9.9% the 
result of companies which were already present in the mar-
ket but which have added or withdrawn products and/or des-
tination markets to/from their export portfolio. Therefore, 
over the short term it is not the arrival of new exporting com-
panies that is the principal explanation for growth in French 
exports.
On the other hand, over a ten-year period, the extensive 
mark-up accounts for 53.5% of export dynamics: 26.2% as 
a result of new companies entering the export market and 
27.3% through the multiplication of products or markets by 
those already in place. Over this period, the intensive mark-
up accounts for just 46.5% of the growth in all exports. The 
diﬀ erence between a short-term analysis and an analysis 
over a period of 10 years lies in the fact that the new export 
ﬂ ows are small in size but liable to grow rapidly overtime 
(due to drastic selection of best entrants, with the remainder 
exiting the market fairly quickly) to such an extent that after 
10 years, these initially weak ﬂ ows become signiﬁ cant.
France’s weak export performance does not result from a 
diﬀ erent distribution between the development of existing 
markets (which would have be maintained) and entering new 
markets (which would have been insuﬃ  cient –see the drop in 
the number of exporting companies between 2000 and 2009, 
graph 2). The very strong reliance of French exports on a 
small number of exporting companies is a phenomenon that 
is characteristic of advanced economies,8 and the share of 
the export dynamics between intensive and extensive mark-
ups is similar in other countries. Moreover, the French perfor-
mance is not the result of a peculiar under-representation of 
SMEs in our exports: one third of the value of French exports 
outside of the European Union was accounted for by SMEs 
in 2011. This is lower than for Italy (49%) but higher than for 
Germany (28%) and falls within the European average.9
6 Cf. www.comitecolbert.com. Please see Martin J. and F. Mayneris (2015): “High-End Variety Exporters Defying Distance: Micro Facts and Macroeconomic 
Implications”, Journal of International Economics, to be published and Fontagné L. and S. Hatte (2014): “European High-End Varieties in International 
Competition”, CEPII Working Paper, no 2014-27. The results of these two studies are conﬁ rmed, in the special case of Champagne by Crozet M., K. Head and 
T. Mayer (2012): “Quality Sorting and Trade: Firm-Level Evidence for French Wine”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, no 2, pp. 606-644.
7 See Berman N., V. Rebeyrol and V. Vicard (2015): “Demand Learning and Exporter Dynamics”, Banque de France Working Paper, no 551, May.
8 In 2003, the top 5% largest French exporters accounted for 73% of the country’s exports. The corresponding ﬁ gure was 81% for Germany and 69% for the 
United Kingdom. Italy was slightly lower at 59%. Please see Mayer T. and G. Ottaviano (2007): “The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of European Firms. 
New Facts Based on Firm-Level Evidence”, Bruegel Blueprint Series, vol. III. This extreme concentration remains true at a more detailed level: in 2008, the 
largest 10 French exporters represented just over 20% of total exports; in Spain this ﬁ gure exceeded 40% and in Italy it stood at approximately 10%, see: 
Berthou A., E. Dhyne, M. Bugamelli, A-M. Cazacu, C.V. Demian, C-V., P. Harasztosi, T. Lalinsky, J. Meriküll, F. Oropallo and A.C. Soares (2015): “Assessing 
European Firms’ Exports and Productivity Distributions: The CompNet Trade Module”, ECB Working Paper, no 1788, May.
9 See Cernat L, A. Norman-López and A. Dutch T-Figueras (2014): “SMEs Are More Important than You Think! Challenges and Opportunities for EU Exporting 
SMEs”, Chief Economist DG TRADE Note, no 3, September.
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Export support policies
As we have seen, the creation of new export ﬂ ows is a key 
element in export dynamics at least within a 10 year time-
frame, if not in the short term. These new ﬂ ows may come 
from large companies developing new products or inves-
ting in new markets. They may also come from SMEs that 
are ﬁ rst-time exporters. There are three reasons which would 
justify public intervention in this area.
Information costs
According to recent theories on international trade,10 ﬁ rst-
time exporters face ﬁ xed information-gathering costs which 
weigh proportionately more on small companies than on 
large ones. Numerous SMEs do not export because their pro-
ductivity is inadequate to cover this ﬁ xed cost. Governments 
may therefore wish to support those SMEs closest to the pro-
ductivity threshold to enable them to export, given that the 
start-up cost has only to be borne once. Government action 
is however faced with a number of problems (box 2): it is diﬃ  -
cult to identify companies close to the productivity threshold 
enabling them to export; a large number of ﬁ rst-time expor-
ters are not able to retain their place in target markets, which 
reduces the return on government intervention;11 if a multi-
plicity of support packages for growing overseas leads to the 
replacement of the entry cost to a foreign market (subsidised 
by the government) by a research cost for an adequate sup-
port mechanism (supported by the SME) the net eﬀ ect on 
export capability could be uncertain. In fact, the complexity 
of mechanisms in France is regularly highlighted by assess-
ment committees in spite of rationalisation eﬀ orts.12
In any event, export support policies as they are currently 
structured fail to explain the worsening of the French balance 
of trade. The businesses involved are generally small in size 
and contribute only modestly to external trade; in addition, 
external trade has declined whilst support mechanisms have 
improved. The signiﬁ cant government support (estimated at 
some €600 million in 2012)13 has recently shifted away from 
ﬁ rst-time exporters towards companies that already have 
overseas activities, with the aim of increasing their exports 
and the number of their subsidiaries abroad.
Imperfections in the credit market
A second justiﬁ cation for government intervention deals 
with the ﬁ nancial constraints on SMEs, especially when they 
invest in order to reach export markets. Assessing these 
interventions in terms of ﬁ nancing poses the same problems 
as those related to support (identifying the reference group).
Whereas government intervention in terms of ﬁ nancing 
aﬀ ects a sizeable proportion of exporting companies (see box 
2), it is unlikely that ﬁ nancing is a decisive factor in regaining 
French market share. According to Bricongne & al. (2012),14 
during the 2008 world ﬁ nancial crisis, French exporting com-
panies were less aﬀ ected by the discontinuation of funds 
than by the fall in international trade: over 60% of the fall 
in French exports was due to the “net intensive mark-up” of 
the largest exporting companies (the “top 1%”), which were 
barely aﬀ ected by credit restrictions. The credit squeeze was 
directly felt by companies that were already in ﬁ nancial dif-
ﬁ culty and for which restrictions on loans related to the cri-
sis were an aggravating factor; however as their number was 
low, the impact was limited.
Externalities
A last justiﬁ cation for export aids is based on the presence 
of positive external eﬀ ects on companies upstream and 
downstream of the exporting company. Enabling a company 
to export has a multiplying eﬀ ect insofar as it is able to share 
information with other potential exporters, or simply serve as 
2. Number of exporting companies in France 
2002 to 2014
Source: French customs.
10 Mélitz M. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, vol. 71 , no 6, pp.1695-1725.
11 According to Bentejac and Desponts (2013) around one third of ﬁ rst-time exporters (not having exported in the previous ﬁ ve years) survive beyond one 
year. This proportion is 70% for businesses which are members of a group. See Bentejac A. and J. Desponts (2013): Mission d’évaluation sur l’eﬃ  cacité du 
dispositif d’appui à l’internationalisation de l’économie française, Ministère du Commerce extérieur (French Ministry of Foreign Trade), La Documentation 
française, June.
12 See Bentejac and Desponts (2013), op. cit., Cour des Comptes (2011): Le soutien public aux entreprises exportatrices, Annual Report and Inspection 
Générale des Finances (2013) “ Pour des aides simples et eﬃ  caces au service de la compétitivité”, IGF (French General Inspection of Finance) Report, 
no 2013-M-016-02, June.
13 See Bentejac A. and J. Desponts (2013) op cit.
14 Bricongne J-Ch., L. Fontagné, G. Gaulier, D. Taglioni and V. Vicard (2012): “Firms and the Global Crisis: French Exports in the Turmoil”, Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 87, no 1, pp. 134-146.
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a demonstration model for close competitors. Recent studies 
conﬁ rm the existence of these positive eﬀ ects.15 However, 
competitiveness clusters do not seem to have a knock-on 
eﬀ ect on R&D, the number of patents or turnover. Some stu-
dies do demonstrate the positive impact of competitiveness 
clusters on the probability to continue exporting for expor-
ters in these clusters. However, these companies are more 
dependent on the cluster’s “lead” company and their mem-
bership within clusters does not seem to have protected 
them during the 2008-2009 ﬁ nancial crisis.16
Compared with other European countries, France is at the 
upper range of government export support (box 3). The types 
of support mechanism are similar from one country to ano-
ther. However, French support schemes are characterised by 
a larger share of services invoiced to companies.
Observation 3. A wide range of 
government export support mechanisms 
are available to French SMEs. Even 
though they would gain from being further 
rationalised, these mechanisms are not 
the primary answer to the erosion of 
French market share.
Inadequate non-price competitiveness
“Pure” competitiveness, as deﬁ ned above, comprises a price 
dimension and a non-price dimension. Price competitiveness 
is the result of unit production costs (labour costs, energy 
costs, cost of capital, intermediate consumption etc., net of 
productivity gains), mark-ups and nominal exchange rates. 
2. Government export support policies 
In France, a large number of stakeholders are involved 
in helping companies grow their business overseas and 
over 90% of medium-sized businesses and SMEs which are 
already trading internationally or are about to do so (2% of 
the total of all companies) state that they use at least one 
support body.a The processes cover two major types of 
support packages:
 – Advisory: information, access to international contacts 
or partners in the target market, attendance at trade 
shows, employment assistance through the “post-
graduate students for international business” pro-
gramme etc. Business France (previously Ubifrance) 
provides trade advice and support to some 9,000 busi-
nesses each year to which is to be added the networks 
of French chambers of commerce located overseas 
and that of the Department of Finance, the diploma-
tic network, foreign trade advisers, as well as secto-
ral agencies (agriculture, cultural products, etc.), help 
provided at the regional and local levels and suprana-
tional schemes for promoting exports coming from the 
European Union;
 – Financing and insurance: public intervention is essen-
tially carried out by BPI France and by Coface. Three 
schemes, targeting approximately 1,000 companies 
per year, are provided by BPI France: export develop-
ment loans (unsecured loans guaranteed by public 
funds); cash ﬂ ow loans (export loans, buyer-credit); 
bank loan guarantees. Coface oﬀ ers credit insurance 
(as a private insurer) and assistance in surveying 
potential markets (on behalf of the State). It boasted 
37,000 customers in 2013.
Crozet & al. (2013)b have assessed the direct impact of 
a small number of services provided by Ubifrance and 
Coface on the export performance of French companies 
between 2005 and 2010, by comparing those companies 
receiving support with their peers (same characteristics in 
terms of sector, size and productivity) not receiving sup-
port. According to this study, the main impact of the assis-
tance in surveying potential markets provided by Coface 
appears to be an increase in export volumes for exporters 
already in place (about + 20%) and in the number of des-
tinations (approximately one additional country). Support 
packages set up by Ubifrance and which focus on coachi-
ng a group of companies appear to be the only ones that 
encourage companies to get started in international trade; 
both schemes have an impact on exported volumes that 
is similar in size, but the latter appears to be short-term 
while assistance in surveying markets has a more sustai-
nable impact. These results are in line with that of other 
countries,c although it should be noted that all studies 
(including this one on France) are quite sensitive to the 
choice of control group. These results are also in line with 
surveys carried out by Business France and BPI France.
a A survey of 250 SMEs and medium-sized businesses, see Bentejac 
and Desponts (2013) op. cit.
b Crozet M., T. Mayer, F. Mayneris and D. Mirza (2013): “Eﬃ  cacité des 
dispositifs de soutien à l’exportation des ﬁ rmes françaises”, CEPII 
Working Paper, no 2013-03.
c Cadot O., A.M. Fernandes, J. Gourdon, J. and A. Mattoo (2011): 
“An Evaluation of Tunisia’s Export Promotion Program”, IGC-DECTI 
Workshop, The World Bank, 14 October. Volpe Martincus C. and 
J. Carballo (2008): “Is Export Promotion Eﬀ ective in Developing 
Countries? Firm-Level Evidence on the Intensive and the Extensive 
Margins of Exports”, Journal of International Economics, vol. 76, no 1, 
pp. 89-106. Van Biesebroeck J., E. Yu and S. Chen (2015): “The Impact 
of Trade Promotion Services on Canadian Exporter Performance”, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, to be published
15 Koenig P., F. Mayneris and S. Poncet (2010): “Local Export Spillovers in France”, European Economic Review, vol. 54, no 4, pp. 622-641.
16 See Askenazy P. and P. Martin (2014): “Promouvoir l’égalité des chances à travers le territoire”, Note du Conseil d’analyse économique, no 20, February, 
which recommends an independent assessment of competitiveness clusters and a reduction in their number, and Bellégo C. and V. Dortet-Bernadet 
(2013): ”La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l’activité des PME et ETI ?”, INSEE (French National Institute 
of Statistics and Economic Studies) Working Paper, no G2013/06.
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Non-price competitiveness may be considered as a residual 
in that it is the part of demand that is not explained by price. 
It has a variety dimension (horizontal product diﬀ erentiation, 
diﬀ erent yoghurt ﬂ avours for example) and a quality dimen-
sion (vertical product diﬀ erentiation, more or less creamy 
yoghurts for example).
The fact that non-price competitiveness is not directly mea-
surable makes any diagnosis rather precarious, particularly 
when it is based on aggregated data.17 Here we have adop-
ted a micro-economic perspective: we compare changes in 
non-price competitiveness for products exported by France 
to those of other major OECD countries on the basis of disag-
gregated data by product for the period 2000 to 2013. The 
non-price competitiveness indicator used reﬂ ects product 
characteristics which see increased demand at a given price. 
The idea is that consumers are ready to pay a higher price for 
products with attributes –other than price– which they value 
strongly: brand, company image, exporting country, quality 
of associated services, reputation, product reliability, design 
etc. Details of the method are set out in box 4.
France ranks 7th in the OECD
We limit ourselves here to sectors which represent more than 
1% of exports for each country under consideration. Table 3 
sets out the 10 leading sectors for non-price competitiveness 
in France and Germany in 2013. The sectors are classiﬁ ed 
by decreasing ranking within the OECD. As such, France’s 
number one sector in terms of non-price competitiveness is 
aeronautics, in which France ranks top amongst the OECD 
countries. This non-price competitiveness is assessed at 2.4: 
in this sector, French exporters could set prices more than 
twice as high what they would be if their quality was identical 
3. Support policies for growing overseas in some European countries 
In Germany the promotion of exports is by and large in 
the hands of the Ministry of the Economy with a 2012 bud-
get of EUR138.4 million. A large share of this is invested 
in organising trade fairs and exhibitions (40%) and in the 
consular networks of 120 bilateral chambers of com-
merce (27%). The latter have 2,200 staﬀ  and 50,000 mem-
ber companies spread over 80 countries. Support sche-
mes at federal level are also based on ﬁ nancial advisers 
at embassies and on the German Trade and Invest agency, 
an agency of the Ministry of the Economy with some 300 
agents and a budget of EUR17 million. Companies are sup-
ported at State or Länder level by local chambers of com-
merce; in the most industrialised Länder, speciﬁ c advisory 
bodies support locally-based companies in exporting. In 
addition, companies receive guarantees and credit insu-
rance (EUR30 billion in 2011) of which 75% is allocated to 
trade with emerging and developing countries; this budget 
supports export growth but also covers industrial policy, 
foreign policy and employment protection objectives.
The Italian system is supported by the Ministry of Foreign 
Aﬀ airs and the Ministry of Economic Development, the 
former having a coordinating role based on its diploma-
tic networks whilst the latter is responsible for granting 
export aid (supporting promotional work, preferential 
loans or credit insurance products, in particular for SMEs). 
This system was reformed in 2013 to recentralise cer-
tain skills which had been devolved to the regions, with 
the aim of making processes more transparent and eﬃ  -
cient. Financial support granted by the Italian State has 
been halved over the past years, reaching EUR33 million 
in 2012.
In the United Kingdom, export support is organised jointly 
by the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Aﬀ airs, via UKTI (UK 
Trade and Investment - the equivalent of Business France). 
This is based on a regional organisation of 12 agencies dis-
persed throughout the country. The UKTI has a budget equiva-
lent to EUR368 million for 2014-2015, i.e. more than double 
the 2013-2014 budget. It has nearly 2,300 employees, half of 
which are based abroad. Moreover, the British model is based 
on cooperation with private service providers and chambers 
of commerce located abroad (for example the China Britain 
Business Council). Sectoral priorities (health, defence, crea-
tive industries, oil and gas and agribusiness) and geogra-
phic priorities (high growth emerging markets) were set 
out. 54,190 companies used one or more of the UKTI ser-
vices between October 2013 and September 2014 (compa-
red with 25,400 in 2011) including 11,430 ﬁ rst-time expor-
ters. The latter have access to a number of free services or 
grants, for example export advice from a UKTI expert, ﬁ nan-
cial help in attending exhibitions and trade shows overseas 
and access to market research for overseas. Other services 
are to be paid for, as with the Overseas Market Introduction 
Service (which oﬀ ers a number of schemes using on-site 
UKTI experts) or Postgraduate Students for International 
Business introduced in 2014. Via UK Export Finance, busi-
nesses that have not been able to secure insurance on the 
private market were able in 2013 to beneﬁ t from insurance 
products amounting to approximately £2 billion.
17 See for example Borey G and B Quille (2013): “Comment s’explique le rééquilibrage des balances commerciales en Europe ?”, Note de Conjoncture de 
l’INSEE, June, pp. 19-40.
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to the average for OECD countries. This advantage stands at 
7.3 in the leather goods sector, in which France ranks second 
amongst the OECD countries in terms of non-price competi-
tiveness.
The three sectors in which France is most competitive in the 
non-price dimension are aeronautics, leather goods and wine. 
In Germany, these sectors are automotive spare parts, non-
ferrous metals and plastic products. These top three sectors 
represent 15% of German exports, compared with just 7% of 
French exports. In addition, Germany ranks top in the OECD 
in three sectors, whilst France ranks second in leather goods 
and third for wine. Moving down the list, Germany remains 
the No. 1 in its ﬁ rst ten sectors, whilst France falls to eighth 
position in the OECD in its tenth sector (plastic products). 
Germany therefore clearly ranks ahead of France in terms 
of non-price competitiveness. This is even more disadvanta-
geous for French exports given that amongst the ten most 
competitive sectors in non-price criteria, four are common to 
both countries: Germany is our closest competitor and out-
performs us in terms of non-price competition.
We now turn to the top 10 countries in terms of non-price 
competitiveness for each sector. In 2013, France had 55 sec-
tors (out of 102 analysed) in the OECD “top 10” (graph 3), pla-
cing it in seventh position overall in the OECD, a relatively good 
4. Measuring non-price competitiveness
Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) have adapted the method 
developed by Khanelwal, Schott and Wei (2013) in 
order to estimate the quality of exported products at 
the HS-6 level (over 5,000 products) using bilateral 
international trade data.a The data used here is that of 
BACI, a database developed by the CEPII based on the 
United Nations’ COMTRADE data.b Estimates concen-
trate on the 50 exporting and importing countries 
with the highest ﬂ ows of trade.c To compare countries 
similar to France, we have concentrated on exporting 
countries which are members of the OECD.
Non-price competitiveness is estimated on the basis of 
a demand function which depends negatively on prices, 
with a constant elasticity of substitution, and positively 
on non-price products’ attributes (including perceived 
quality):
xkint + σk pkint = β PIBit + λ Din+ αknt+ εkint
where xkint and pkint  are logarithms of the quantity and 
price (unit values) of a product k exported by country i 
to destination n in year t.
The method has been changed to take into account 
bilateral determinants of international trade such as 
distance, shared language, border eﬀ ects and colonial 
links, grouped together in the term Din. In addition, the 
ﬁ xed eﬀ ect αknt includes demand as well as the degree 
of competition in the destination country. Finally, the 
equation controls for the eﬀ ect of the country of ori-
gin’s size. The elasticity of substitution between pro-
ducts σk is from Broda and Weinstein (2006).
d
Estimated non-price competitiveness qkint is the resi-
dual of the equation εkint standardised by the elasti-
city of the corresponding product: qkint = εkint/(σk – 1).
A equivalent residual reveals higher non-price competi-
tiveness when related to products with low elasticities 
for which price variations have little impact on sales. 
This measure of non-price competitiveness is then 
aggregated by sector (102 sectors).
a Bas M., P. Martin and T. Mayer (2014): Report on Main Directions 
of Research Towards Better Assessment of Competitiveness, 
Mapcompete. Khandelwal A., P. Schott and S. Wei (2013): “Trade 
Liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from 
Chinese Exporters”, American Economic Review, vol. 103, no 6, 
pp. 2169-95.
b For a detailed description of this data please see Gaulier G. 
and S. Zignago (2010): “BACI: International Trade Database at 
the Product-Level, The 1994-2007 Version”, CEPII Working Paper, 
no 2010-23.
c The list of countries is set out in Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) 
op. cit., table 1.
d Broda C. and D. Weinstein (2006): “Globalization and the Gains 
from Variety”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, no 2, May.
Market 
share 
within 
the OECD 
as a %
Sector 
share 
of total 
country 
exports 
as a %
Non-price 
competi-
tivenessa
OECD
Ranking
France
Aeronautics 10.2 3.4 2.4 1
Leather goods 25.6 1.3 7.3 2
Wine 28.0 2.4 2.2 3
Electrical distribution 
equipment 6.0 1.7 4.5 3
Automotive spare parts 6.2 6.0 1.4 5
Dairy products 14.6 2.2 1.2 5
Clothing 9.3 1.1 1.2 5
Plastics 7.5 3.9 1.1 7
Other metal products 5.8 2.2 1.2 7
Plastic products 6.4 2.8 1.3 8
Germany
Automotive spare parts 22.6 8.0 3.4 1
Non-ferrous metals 16.4 3.6 1.4 1
Plastic products 20.4 3.3 2.8 1
Automotive vehicles 16.8 3.0 1.6 1
Other metal products 21.5 3.0 2.2 1
Electrical distribution 
equipment 24.2 2.5 34.2 1
Machinery, other 20.7 2.3 3.7 1
Machine-tools 27.4 2.3 2.1 1
Precision instruments 21.1 2.2 21.4 1
Electronic components 17.1 1.8 25.6 1
Note: a Price equivalent. For example, the ﬁ gure “2” means that in the 
sector being considered, exporters may set prices that are twice as 
high as they would be if their quality was identical to the average for 
OECD countries.
Sources: Authors’ calculations: cf. Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) op. cit. 
and the WTO.
3. The 10 leading sectors for non-price 
competitiveness, France and Germany, 2013
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(and stable) position.18 The graph shows that Germany is out 
in front with 85 sectors in the “top 10”. Italy, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Japan are all slightly ahead 
of France but to a lesser degree (between 57 and 65 products). 
The USA performed slightly less well than France (51 products).
Graph 4a breaks down the market share variations of several 
OECD countries into variations due to price competitiveness 
and non-price competitiveness, for the period 2000-2013. 
Here we examine market share compared with the OECD 
average, and therefore between comparable countries. This 
graph compares Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA 
on the one hand, which lost greater market share than the 
OECD average, and Germany and above all Poland on the 
other hand, which lost less than average market share and 
even gained market share (in the case of Poland and more 
generally Central and Eastern European countries, Mexico 
and Turkey which are not represented on the graph). In 
both cases, changes in market share seem to be primarily 
explained by non-price competitiveness, which decreased 
in the ﬁ rst group and increased in the second. France ﬁ nds 
itself in an intermediate position which, nonetheless, masks 
contrasted changes between sectors19 and over time.
... but has dropped in several sectors since 2008
From 2000 to 2007, French market share dropped a little less 
rapidly than the OECD average (graph 4b). Over this period, 
French price competitiveness worsened (partly due to the 
appreciation of the Euro), but this is oﬀ set by a net increase in 
non-price competitiveness. Over this same period, Germany 
4. Relative annual variations in market share and
price and non-price competitiveness component, in  %
a. 2000-2013
Interpretation: Relative change compared with the OECD average.
Source: Authors’ calculations: cf. Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) op. cit.
b. 2000-2007
c. 2008-2013
3. Number of sectors by country in the top 10 
for non-price competitiveness, 2000, 2007 and 2013
Source: Authors’ calculations: cf. Bas, Martin and Mayer (2014) op. cit.
18 The conclusions on relatively high export unit values in the case of France is conﬁ rmed by Fontagné L., G. Gaulier and S. Zignago (2008): “Specialization 
Across Varieties and North–South Competition”, Economic Policy, vol. 23, no 53, pp.51-91. The authors deal with non-European trade.
19 The top two French sectors in terms of non-price competitiveness –aeronautics and leather goods– have shown strong increases in this competitiveness 
since 2000. Please see non-price competitiveness for a number of French sectors at the online sectoral focus, www.cae-eco.fr
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improved its price competitiveness thanks to wage modera-
tion and the delocalisation of the less competitive segments 
of its production chain. But the marked increase in its non-
price competitiveness demonstrates that Germany used this 
period to increase the quality of its products. This observation 
downplays the view that Germany has carried out a strategy 
based solely on reducing related costs over this period.
Over the period 2008 to 2013, France performance was far 
below the OECD average, even though its price competitive-
ness improved slightly (graph 4c). Its non-price competitive 
greatly deteriorated. It is possible that the pre-2008 non-price 
competitiveness improvement was primarily driven by a selec-
tion eﬀ ect: given the decline of price competitiveness during 
this period, only the most productive exporters and those with 
high non-price competitiveness were able to survive, which is 
consistent with the drop in the number of exporters recorded 
up to 2009 (graph 2) and the drop in industry mark-up rates.20 
As of 2008, whilst France’s cost-competitiveness improved 
slightly, the lack of innovation, investment and an upmarket 
shift (diﬃ  cult when mark-ups are weak) seem to have led to 
a non-price competitiveness fall-out. Although still in the “top 
10”, a number of sectors have declined for France: electrical 
distribution equipment, wine, automotive spare parts and fur-
nishings.
Observation 4. Amongst the OECD 
countries, France enjoys relatively 
good (7th in the OECD) non-price 
competitiveness, but this competitiveness 
has declined since 2008. Germany is 
in pole position amongst the OECD 
countries.
How can market share be regained?
Debates on competitiveness tend to focus on explanations 
to France’s export underachievement of lesser importance 
(poor geographic or sectoral specialisation, credit constraints 
or insuﬃ  cient exporter support) and give insuﬃ  cient promi-
nence to the most important quantitative factor: the quality/
price ratio of products.
Price competitiveness
Price competitiveness is understood diﬀ erently according to 
whether we are looking at the euro area markets or the non-
euro area, even if we need to put this distinction in perspec-
tive insofar as France is in competition with countries in the 
euro area in non-euro area markets.
Exchange rate
Competitiveness in non-euro area markets strongly depends 
on the euro exchange rate. Estimates of data from French 
companies suggest that, all other things being equal, a 10% 
depreciation of the euro compared with a partner country 
outside of the euro area increases the sales value of the ave-
rage exporting company to that country by some 5 to 6%. 
This increase –which generally takes place in the same year 
as the depreciation– arises mainly from an increase in export 
volumes (4 to 5%) and the remainder (0.5 to 1%) from an 
increase in mark-ups on each unit sold (via a slight increase 
in the price in euros).21 Overall, the impact of a 10% depre-
ciation of the euro on the value of exports is greater –some 
7 to 8%– as this depreciation not only improves the position 
of exporters already in the market but also encourages new 
companies to enter export markets. From March 2014 to 
March 2015, France’s eﬀ ective exchange rate depreciated by 
approximately 6%. Applying a simple rule of three suggests 
that our exports should increase by 4 to 5%.
Labour and intermediate consumption
What then are the cost components thanks to which French 
economic policy can stand out from its competitors in the 
euro area? The debate tends to focus on direct labour costs 
in exporting sectors, whilst a breakdown of the value-added 
of exports shows that only 23% of export value is attributable 
to labour cost in the export sector directly concerned. Labour 
cost in other areas used in domestic intermediate consump-
tion represents 21% of export value. The remaining 56% 
comes from intermediate consumption (excluding labour cost 
from domestic intermediate consumption) including impor-
ted products (25% of export values). These ﬁ gures encourage 
an examination of imports as a way of optimising the value 
chain, of smoothly increasing the price of electricity which 
weighs heavily on some exports22 and, ﬁ nally, of controlling 
the costs associated with services which have increased 
greatly over the past 10 years compared with Germany due 
not only to labour costs but also the still high level of obs-
tacles to competition in the service sector.23
More generally, it should be emphasised that the entire 
French economy contributes to the creation of price com-
petitiveness. Improving the way that the housing market 
works, for example, contributes to competitiveness insofar 
20 See Martin, J. and I. Méjean (2014): “Low-Wage Countries’ Competition, Reallocation Across Firms and the Quality Content of Exports”, Journal of 
International Economics, vol. 93, no 1, pp. 140-152. Aghion, Ph., Cette, G. and E. Cohen (2014): Changer de modèle, Odile Jacob.
21 See Bénassy-Quéré, A., Gourinchas, P.O., Martin, Ph. and G. Plantin (2014): “L’euro dans la ‘guerre des monnaies’”, Note du Conseil d’analyse économique, 
no 11, January.
22 See Bureau D., L. Fontagné and P. Martin (2013): ” Énergie et compétitivité”, Note du Conseil d’analyse économique, no 6, May.
23 See the Conseil d’analyse économique (French Council of Economic Analysis) (2014): “Quelles réformes pour la France ? Les préconisations du CAE”, Note 
du Conseil d’analyse économique, no 15, July.
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as an increase in rents and property prices weighs heavily on 
household budgets and over time leads to increases in sala-
ries. This line of reasoning can be extended to all services in 
the sheltered sector including government oﬃ  ces: the entire 
French economy is aﬀ ected by the question of price competi-
tiveness, not just front-line exporting companies.
“CICE targeting”
The Employment Competitiveness Tax Credit (CICE) imple-
mented at the start of 2013 following the Gallois report 
on French industrial competitiveness,24 has as its explicit 
purpose to stimulate employment and improve business com-
petitiveness. We concentrate here on this second objective.
The yearly EUR20billion of CICE tax credits represents, in 
principle, an overall reduction in labour cost of 3% for those 
companies concerned. Exporting companies therefore have 
the choice between: lowering their export price and therefore 
increasing their price competitiveness and market share, or 
raising their mark-ups and oﬀ ering wage increases. We still 
lack hindsight in knowing how French companies have reac-
ted, although the results of surveys shed some light insight.25 
But we know that this CICE tax credit covers wages up to 
2.5 times the legal minimum salary (SMIC), a threshold cho-
sen so as to aﬀ ect the industrial companies accounting for a 
large share of exports and whose employees are, on average, 
higher paid than in the service industries. At these levels of 
remuneration, (skilled) employees face a relatively low risk 
of unemployment: employees having graduated from secon-
dary school are faced with an unemployment rate close to 
5%. In these circumstances exemptions reducing, a priori, 
labour cost by 1% could result in an increase in salaries of 
0.9%.26 A posteriori, the fall in labour costs would therefore 
only be 0.1% for employees subject to a low unemployment 
rate. The possible gain in price competitiveness or increase 
in mark-ups would therefore be limited. These results sug-
gest that the eﬀ ect of CICE tax credits on wage dynamics 
should be assessed and, if this analysis were to show a stron-
ger growth in wages above 1.5 times the legal minimum wage 
after these tax credits have been set up, then the beneﬁ t of 
these tax credits and the responsibility agreement should be 
re-focused on wages lower than 1.5 times the legal minimum.
The counter-argument generally put forward is that decrea-
sing costs on low wages primarily beneﬁ ts the non-tradable 
sector –retail or personal services, for example. Exporting 
companies, which are generally industrial companies, employ 
more workers at relatively high salaries. By not aﬀ ecting 
higher salaries, the CICE tax credit would be missing its com-
petitiveness objective. However, as we have seen, a large pro-
portion of export value is made up of incorporated services, 
including a share of low-skilled services (cleaning, security, 
catering and transport). A decrease in the cost of low-skilled 
labour is therefore an important component in price compe-
titiveness.
Recommendation1. Assess the impact 
of CICE tax credits on wage dynamics. 
If there is stronger growth in relatively 
high wages after CICE tax credits have 
been implemented then reductions in 
social security contributions should be 
concentrated on lower wages.
Non-price competitiveness
Non-price competitiveness policies largely overlap with pro-
ductivity policies which also involve stimulating innovation 
and increasing quality. This is why we can here refer to the 
recommendations made by the CAE regarding training and 
research.27 This is, in particular, the case with professional 
training which should also be considered as an investment 
for increased competitiveness and an upmarket shift.
However, as demonstrated by the example of luxury goods, 
brands play a speciﬁ c role in exports by oﬀ setting cost disad-
vantages and eliminating the handicap of geographic dis-
tance. Intellectual property rights issues should be a prio-
rity in international trade negotiations in which Europe is 
engaged, and this should be clearly aﬃ  rmed by the French 
authorities. The rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) by the European Parliament in July 2012 
is, from this point of view, particularly concerning in contrast 
with its signature in 2011 by Canada, the USA, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, New Zealand and Morocco.
Recommendation 2. Make defending 
intellectual property rights a priority in 
international negotiations.
24 Gallois L. (2012): Pacte pour la compétitivité de l’industrie française, Report for the French Prime Minister, La Documentation française.
25 Cf. INSEE (French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) outlook paper on the use of CICE tax credits (2014). Generally, companies state 
that they will use this tax credit to increase their operating proﬁ ts; for 58% of industrial companies and 52% of service companies this extra resource will be 
used mostly for investment.
26 Cahuc P. and S. Carcillo (2014): Alléger le coût du travail pour augmenter l’emploi : les clés de la réussite, Institut Montaigne. See also Plane M. (2012): 
“Évaluation de l’impact économique du CICE”, Revue de l’OFCE (French Economic Observatory), no 126, or Bock S., P. Lissot and S. Ozil (2015): “Matis : 
une maquette d’évaluation des eﬀ ets sur l’emploi de variations du coût du travail”, Document de Travail de la DG Trésor (French Treasury) Working Paper, 
no 2015/02, March, which uses a decreasingly elastic proﬁ le of employment in relation to cost according to wage level.
27 Artus P., C. García-Peñalosa and P. Mohnen (2014): “Redresser la croissance potentielle de la France”, Note du Conseil d’analyse économique, no 16, 
September; Fontagné L., P. Mohnen and G. Wolﬀ  (2014): “Pas d’industrie, pas d’avenir ?”, Note du Conseil d’analyse économique, no 13, June.
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However, productivity is not just a question of design and 
innovation. Recent studies suggest that an important part 
(between one quarter and one third) of diﬀ erences in produc-
tivity between companies and between countries is simply 
due to the quality of company management.28 France ranks 
seventh amongst the OECD countries in terms of the average 
quality of its company management. Compared with countries 
like Germany or the USA, it is nevertheless characterised by a 
large proportion of small companies with weaker management 
quality on average and therefore lower productivity.
Lastly, growth in the productivity, and therefore competiti-
veness, of a country comes largely (50% according to recent 
studies) from reallocating production factors from under-
productive towards more productive companies. Rigidity in 
the employment and goods markets limit this reallocation.29 
Measured at company level for each French industrial sec-
tor, the average diﬀ erence between wages and productivi-
ty increased by almost 15% in real terms between 2002 and 
2007.30 This phenomenon of companies not working at opti-
mum size is most marked at around 50 employees, reﬂ ecting a 
threshold eﬀ ect. But this worsening is no more marked in the 
area of this threshold. Other possibilities need therefore be 
considered such as the cost of redundancies, bankruptcy law 
and goods and services market regulations.31
Recommendation 3. In deliberations on 
structural reforms, the impact of these 
reforms on the reallocation of production 
factors (labour and capital) to the more 
productive companies should be explicitly 
taken into consideration.
Finally we can see that export performance is, for a large part, 
a simple reﬂ ection of the eﬃ  ciency of the national production 
system, such that competitiveness policies overlap with poli-
cies to improve productivity.   
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